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SOME THOUGHTS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE
GENERAL THEORY OF SECOND BEST
JOHN J. DONOHUE III*
The General Theory of Second Best is at once fascinating and
paralyzing-fascinating because it so powerfully assaults much of
modem economic theory; paralyzing in that it does not offer a clear
replacement for what it purports to destroy. Richard Markovits, who
has done so much to keep this important theory in the minds of law
and economics scholars, gives an example that suggests the difficulty:
suppose a tort doctrine is implemented which compels manufacturers
to pay the cost imposed by their discharge of pollutants into any body
of water.' At first blush, the policy change seems unambiguously
good. Prior to the doctrinal change, manufacturers who dumped nox-
ious chemicals and metals into bodies of water created "externali-
ties"-social costs that they imposed with impunity. As a result, a
manufacturer would maximize profits by discharging pollutants when-
ever there was even the slightest benefit in so doing. In other words, a
market system, instead of providing incentives to promote the public
good, will through the presence of large external costs encourage un-
deniably harmful activity. It would seem that eliminating this per-
verse incentive could only be beneficial, and, at least in the absence of
the General Theory of Second Best, this logic would be unassailable.
But once the disruptive General Theory of Second Best is introduced,
all bets are off unless there happens to be no other distortion in the
economy-a most unlikely event.
Say, for example, that the tort doctrine in question is designed to
provide the appropriate price for water pollutants but still leaves man-
ufacturers free to pollute the air without compensating for the social
harm. In all likelihood, making the water polluters pay will lead to a
shift to less water-polluting technologies and reduce demand for the
goods produced by such pollution. Nonetheless, Markovits has noted
ominously that it is just as likely that establishing ostensibly correct
prices for water pollution "will decrease allocative efficiency on bal-
* Professor of Law, Stanford University; Research Associate, National Bureau of Eco-
nornic Research.
1. See Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-Alloca-
tively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: The Whys and Some There-
fores, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 313, 320 n.7 (1996).
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ance by giving the relevant actors an artificial incentive to make allo-
catively inefficient shifts from water-polluting to air-polluting
production-techniques and locations."' 2 Markovits' claim that it is
"equally likely' 3 that the doctrine in question will hurt as that it will
help is true only in the sense that when you know nothing about which
of two events will occur, you can assume they are equally likely.
Nonetheless, his statement does dramatize the point that even tutored
economic intuitions are suspect in the unsettling world of the second
best. Moreover, Markovits' example also points out a danger of the
General Theory of Second Best-it may be invoked opportunistically
by water polluters to prevent desirable pollution laws, because it pro-
vides yet another hurdle to the correction of market imperfections.
But how can the act of discouraging something bad itself be
harmful? An intervention that simultaneously discourages one bad
outcome while encouraging an even worse outcome may well have an
overall effect that is welfare-reducing. Grant that marijuana is bad
and that avoiding its use is wise and we still cannot say that a policy of
banning marijuana is good. If the marijuana ban encourages the use
of alcohol which some suggest is a more socially harmful drug, the ban
may increase total social costs.
I. INSIGHTS FOR REGULATORY POLICY
How should we respond to the General Theory of Second Best?
Andrew Morriss looks at the problem of public utility regulation and
is grateful to find another obstacle to the "correction" of market im-
perfections. 4 Morriss argues that greater appreciation of the General
Theory of Second Best would weaken our overconfidence "in our
ability to forecast the impacts of regulation and precisely calibrate
regulatory interventions." 5 My sense, though, is that very few believe
that economists can precisely calibrate the impact of regulatory inter-
ventions. Those in favor of interventions generally tend to overesti-
mate the expected benefits and underestimate the expected costs, but
I am not sure that the General Theory of Second Best is likely to be
the best tool to correct these biases. Rather, a systematic study of the
actual consequences of an array of interventions will probably be
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Andrew P. Morriss, Implications of Second-Best Theory for Administrative and Reg-
ulatory Law: A Case Study of Public Utility Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 135 (1998).
5. Id. at 137.
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more persuasive to those in a position to influence policy than a some-
what arcane economic theory.6
Indeed, I would take Morriss's paper as a case in point. The posi-
tive consequences of deregulation in the phone company and airline
industry-which second-best theory might have given little reason to
expect-have probably done far more than any economic theory ever
could to convince the public of the harms of needless regulation. As
technological change enables previous natural monopolies to become
competitive industries, the public will push for greater deregulation,
and my guess is, despite the predictions of the General Theory of Sec-
ond Best about the inability to make such guesses, superior products
will be produced at less cost-which I take to be good. Of course, it is
always possible that the greater production of the unfettered former
public utilities will cause even greater social costs, if, for example, in-
sufficient restrictions on the discharge of pollution causes that prob-
lem to grow sufficiently more severe. To use an analogy, we would
rather that, say, criminal activity were supplied by a monopoly, with
its accompanying depressing effect on output, than by a vibrant and
competitive criminal enterprise.7
Morriss's understandable dismay with the shortcomings of gov-
ernmental interventions cannot justify his broader suggestion that we
might be better off with no intervention.8 The police, for example, are
woefully inefficient, certainly little better than the post office or public
schools in terms of the dubious efficiency with which they perform
their respective tasks. Still, the evident shortcomings do not make out
the case for the elimination of public police departments.
Morriss suggests we should all have greater humility when it
comes to the arena of public policy.9 Yet one need not be a devotee of
the General Theory of Second Best to heed the call for more humility.
Indeed, one might take the fine paper by Don Fullerton and Gilbert
6. Yet even here, empirical evaluation is often difficult, the results are often inconclusive,
and the consequent uncertainties tend to leave those with an axe ample opportunity to grind.
7. Indeed, one might make the point in general that monopolies that produce bad or
harmful commodities may well be preferable to competitive production. Thus, the sugar price
support system-a ludicrous pay-out to special interests-might be worthwhile in the second-
best world if consumers tend to overindulge in sweets to their detriment. For the reasons dis-
cussed below, a sugar tax would be preferable to the sugar quota, but possibly more politically
infeasible. In that event, the current price support regime might still dominate a competitive
sugar market.
8. See Morriss, supra note 4, at 185-88 (advocating a contractual approach).
9. See id. at 137-38.
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Metcalf 0 as further evidence that nuanced and sophisticated analyses
often overturn simple and intuitive economic arguments. This cer-
tainly counsels humility because even the conclusions of nuanced and
sophisticated economic analyses may well be overturned by yet more
nuanced and sophisticated approaches."
II. POLLUTION TAXES AND THE SECOND BEST
In comparing the Pigovian pollution taxes with command-and-
control environmental regulations, Fullerton and Metcalf have, in es-
sence, rehearsed the analysis of the difference between a tariff and an
import quota.12 Either policy instrument can limit the number of im-
ports of, say, Japanese cars into America. The quota leads to higher
prices for Japanese cars, with the monopoly profits pocketed by the
Japanese automakers. The appropriate tariff leads to the same
number of imported cars being sold at the same (after-tariff) price to
the consumer, but the difference between the buying price and the
cost of manufacture goes not to the Japanese but to the American
treasury. It is not surprising, then, that the Japanese have been willing
to submit to quotas "voluntarily," while they would never acquiesce to
the imposition of tariffs.
In the pollution context, the choice between the pollution quota
and the pollution tariff raises similar issues. The government wants
the tariff, while the polluter wants the quota. Thus, Fullterton and
Metcalf conclude: "the choice between pollution restrictions and pol-
lution taxes is essentially a choice about who gets the scarcity rents.
The pollution restriction leaves those rents in private hands, which
might make the whole program politically palatable to business.' 13
The choice between tariffs and quotas in both the car and pollution
10. Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend
Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221 (1998).
11. Examples of more refined analyses switching the conclusions of earlier economic mod-
els abound. Thus, an early model predicted that the British rule, in which losers in litigation pay
all the litigation expenses, would increase the likelihood of settlement was followed by a subse-
quent model (by the same author) predicting that the British rule would decrease the likelihood
of settlement, and then by a further analysis based on the work of Ronald Coase, indicating that
the choice of the American rule or the British rule should have no impact on the rate of settle-
ment. See John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't
Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will? 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1093-94 (1991). For a simi-
lar Odyssey involving the effect of joint and several liability on settlements, see the discussion-in
John J. Donohue III, The Effect of Joint and Several Liability on the Settlement Rate-Mathemati-
cal Symmetries and Metaissues About Rational Litigant Behavior: Comment on Komhauser and
Revesz, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 543 (1994).
12. See Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 10, at 225-32.
13. ld. at 229.
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cases does not affect the consumer's position;14 the only difference is
whether manufacturer or government will gain the scarcity rent.
While clearly the pollution tax is superior to the pollution quota,
Fullerton and Metcalf note that the tax does lower the real wage,
which may exacerbate the distortion generated by existing income
taxes. 15 Even though the pollution tax furnishes the public good of a
better environment, it simultaneously raises the cost of the manufac-
tured good, which is the good purchased from the income of labor.
Starting from the baseline of unrestricted pollution, the pollution tax
makes the act of working less valuable. Presumably, citizens benefit
from the cleaner air or water that the pollution tax buys, but this ben-
efit goes to everyone, whether they work or not. As a result, compen-
sation for hours worked falls, thereby causing a distortionary move
towards greater leisure. Whether this distortionary burden is greater
with the labor tax or the pollution tax is a vexing question, which the
General Theory of Second Best tells us cannot be resolved absent em-
pirical evidence.
There is a possible final irony in Fullerton and Metcalf's demon-
stration that many scholars have been unduly optimistic in asserting
that pollution taxes will yield the double-dividend of a better environ-
ment and more tax revenues with less deadweight loss. In so doing,
Fullerton and Metcalf have certainly diminished the prospect, advo-
cated by some, that excess pollution taxes will be imposed to reduce
the deadweight loss from distortionate labor taxes. Their paper also
shows, however, that, the pollution tax is preferable to the pollution
quota.' 6 Because Fullerton and Metcalf demonstrate why business
strongly prefers the quota to the tax,17 we may have our own ironic
version of the second best in operation here.
Three states of the world are plausible: (1) the overtaxation state
that Fullerton and Metcalf attack; (2) the precise Pigovian tax rate
that they presumably endorse; and (3) the command-and-control reg-
ulation (the undertaxation state) that business so strongly prefers. Be-
cause the pressures of special interests have clearly biased policy
towards state (3), arguments in favor of position (1) might have cor-
rected the political imbalance, thereby making position (2) more
likely. Now that Fullerton and Metcalf have strongly denounced posi-
tion (1), the counterbalance to the special interest bias towards state
14. See id. at 228.
15. See id. at 228-29.




(3) is removed, making (3)-the admittedly worst of the three out-
comes-more likely than (2). This is clearly a frustrating aspect of the
General Theory of Second Best because if the analysis of imperfec-
tions extends to political failures, then making truthful claims about
the undesirability of certain policies may cause more harm than good.
It is not hard to see why most academics shy away from this broad
conception of the theory.
III. THE ROLE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Thomas Ulen has given a wonderfully clear overview of the mis-
sion of law and economics, with its animating theoretical vision based
on the need for correcting various market imperfections.' 8 His paper
counsels that the type of sophisticated analyses promoted by Fullerton
and Metcalf, as well as by Markovits, are commendable exercises for
scholars and may profitably influence the choices of legislatures.
When it comes to the creation of legal doctrine in private litigation,
however, Ulen makes the entirely plausible argument that institution-
ally the judge is not in a suitable position to consider much more than
the local effects of legal rules on the parties.' 9 Therefore, Ulen views
second-best considerations to be beyond the legitimate province of
the common law judge.20 The modal tendencies of Ulen's advice cer-
tainly ring true for me: ["P]rivate law is more appropriate than legis-
lation for addressing inefficiencies when second-best effects are trivial;
legislation is more appropriate than private law for addressing ineffi-
ciencies when second-best effects may be large and widely distrib-
uted. ' '2' Of course, the messiness of the legislative process often
means that important policy decisions will be left in the hands of
judges owing to the ambiguity of the legislative command. Indeed, it
is not implausible that such ambiguities will be greatest when many
widely dispersed parties are vying to have their second-best interests
influence the outcome of the legislative process. In other words, the
demands on the judiciary to render policy judgments may be greatest
in exactly the situation where their institutional competence is most
limited.
18. Thomas S. Ulen, Courts, Legislatures, and the General Theory of Second Best in Law
and Economics, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189 (1998).
19. See id. at 217.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 219.
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The abstruse nature of Markovits' paper 22 implicitly makes the
argument for Ulen's conclusion that judges should not try to engage in
second-best analysis. The complexity of second-best analysis would
quickly overwhelm the capacity of all but the most economically so-
phisticated judges, and the parties would be unlikely to offer signifi-
cant assistance in tracing out all of the distant general equilibrium
effects of any particular doctrinal change. Indeed, Markovits would
no doubt embrace Ulen's recommendations that the place for a full
consideration of second-best factors is in the legislature-hopefully
with the benefit of the rich array of empirical data that is needed to
fully implement the analysis. But while Ulen is satisfied to let judges
seek efficiency in the mode of the traditional law and economics
scholar, Markovits wants to use the General Theory of Second Best as
the battering ram to destroy this traditional approach. Once judges
realize the futility or impossibility of trying to trace out the efffiency
implications of their rulings, they can "make their decisions appropri-
ately reflect rights-considerations, distributional values, and process-
related (participation) values. '23
Of course, the power of the criticisms that Markovits seems to
level against law and economics methodology depends upon what that
methodology is trying to accomplish. Economic modelling necessarily
requires skill in making simplifying assumptions, because one must
transform complex mathematical problems into more tractable forms
capable of yielding findings that are both illuminating and easily pack-
aged for publication or classroom presentation. If the goal of law and
economics is to organize our thinking, then it has largely been success-
ful. If the goal is to give accurate predictions and policy assessments,
then Markovits' criticisms are far more telling. But an example from
the realm of the physical sciences reveals that even an unassailably
important law of nature can be a very bad predictor. Thus, we know
that in a vacuum, a feather and a cannonball will fall at the same
speed if dropped from the same height. But if one woodenly applied
this law of gravity in trying to predict whether the feather or the ca-
nonball would hit the ground first if dropped from the Empire State
Building, the results would be ludicrous. Good and useful theory de-
pends on the use to which it is to be put. Simplifying assumptions may
yield valuable insights in some circumstances, even though their viola-
22. Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting from a "Negligence" System
to a "Strict-Liability" Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A Partial and Prelimi-
nary Third-Best-Allocative-Effiency Analysis, 73 CHI.-KENTrr L. REv. 11 (1998).
23. Id. at 134.
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tion undermines the predictive value of the resulting conclusions.
One would not want a scientist to throw out the laws of gravity be-
cause they fail to predict the consequences of wind acting on an ethe-
real body.
While the simplifications of the physicist at times seem extreme,
they are nothing compared to what is needed to render the complex
social world tractable. For example, I have previously discussed "John
Prather Brown's decision to divide the world into two discrete
classes-injurers and victims-in setting forth the initial formal eco-
nomic model of tort law in 1973"; this choice facilitated the analysis of
the tort doctines of strict liability and negligence because strict liabil-
ity makes little sense unless one party can be identified as "the in-
jurer" and the other as "the victim." '24 Absent this dichotomy it would
thus be difficult to build a model of strict liability for accidents be-
tween two automobiles, because neither party would obviously be the
victim or the injurer.25
As is now well known, given Brown's model and his other crucial
simplification that the only factor that affected accident risk was the
level of care taken by the respective parties, he concluded that both a
negligence standard and a strict liability rule with a contributory negli-
gence defense would induce injurers and victims to take the optimal
level of care.26
But in 1980, Shavell observed that the number of accidents would
be affected not only by how careful injurers and victims were-their
level of care-but also by how much they engaged in the particular
activities that gave rise to accidents-their activity level.27 For exam-
ple, increases in the amount of driving, even by a careful driver, will
certainly increase the risk of an accident. By altering Brown's model,
Shavell demonstrated that no liability standard could simultaneously
give both injurers and victims the proper incentive to choose the opti-
mal levels of care and activity. 28
The reasoning behind Shavell's point is that a negligence stan-
dard puts pressure on injurers to act with due care to avoid the poten-
24. John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1057 (1989).
25. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 115 (1987).
26. This conclusion was also reached by Peter Diamond. See Peter A. Diamond, Accident
Law and Resource Allocation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1974); Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity
Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (1974).
27. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1980).
28. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 29-30 (1987).
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tial liability payments that exceed the cost of taking care. But a
negligence standard will not give injurers a financial incentive to limit
their activity level because they avoid all liability by simply taking due
care. Conversely, the negligence rule gives victims an incentive to
control both their level of care and their activity level, because they
cannot look to careful injurers for any compensation. Strict liability
with a contributory negligence defense creates the exactly reciprocal
pattern: injurers would face the appropriate incentives with respect to
care and the activity level, but victims would have no incentive to con-
trol their activity level.29
But even though Shavell's economic model has generated a very
interesting finding concerning the activity levels of the parties, the
neat conclusion that courts find the efficient levels of care but tend to
ignore the amount of activity may well be erroneous. The reason is
that, in general, courts cannot determine the optimal level of care
without simultaneously knowing the optimal activity level. Hence, in
circumstances in which the proper due care standard varies as activity
level changes, the inability of courts to evaluate the costs and benefits
of different activity levels means that their liability rules will generate
neither optimal care nor optimal activity levels.
Once again, a strong conclusion was reached about an important
aspect of tort law (the activity level/duty of care dichotomy) only be-
cause Shavell imposed certain restrictive conditions-namely, that an
increase in the activity level will affect neither the marginal cost nor
the marginal benefit of taking care. Yet, these conditions are often
violated:
A trucker will presumably find it more difficult to stay alert-that
is, more costly to take care-if he has to drive all night as opposed
to only a few hours. Furthermore, if the trucker keeps driving
through rush-hour traffic, the benefits from heightened care will es-
calate because of the higher accident risk posed by the greater
congestion.30
Once all the bells and whistles have been added on to any eco-
nomic model, the simple and elegant predictions that sometimes cap-
ture the imagination of certain academics, judges, and policymakers
are often reversed or heavily qualified. That should certainly give one
pause before relying too heavily on theoretical economic models as a
tool for crafting policy. Because the General Theory of Second Best is
29. Indeed, victims would have no incentive to control either their activity level or their
level of care without the contributory negligence defense, which gives them an incentive to be
careful. See id. at 27-29.
30. Donohue, supra note 24, at 1062.
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just one more illustration of this general point, Markovits' strong ad-
monition of caveat emptor in the world of law and economics is prob-
ably useful advice. However, harkening back to the earlier discussion
of Fullerton and Metcalf's paper, it is possible that the weakening of
the reliance on law and economics might lead to greater reliance on
even less beneficial modes of analysis. Wise and well-informed policy-
makers are probably our only hope of achieving good results, and if
law and economics can at least illuminate some of the relevant consid-
erations, then we should value that useful, albeit necessarily limited,
contribution.
